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Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
 








AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Daniel Galman, Jr. brought a lawsuit alleging that his former employer, Sysco 
Food Services of Metro New York LLC (“Sysco”), and several related individuals and 
corporations (collectively, “the Sysco Defendants”), violated the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-1 et seq. The United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed Galman’s Complaint because he 
failed to state a claim under either act and because Galman’s NJLAD claim was 
preempted by ERISA. We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 A few months before retiring from Sysco, Galman asked a human resources 
manager how much his lump-sum pension payment would be and requested information 
about a 6% penalty that he believed had been assessed against his account. Before 
receiving an answer, he retired at age 50 in September 2012. 
 After retiring, Galman reiterated his request for information, clarifying that he 
wanted “pension payment calculations, the numbers used in calculation of his pension, 
how the lump-sum amount had been arrived at and whether the money deducted from his 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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pension payment per the 6% penalty had been included in the pension payment that he 
received.” J.A. 47a. When he did not receive a satisfactory response, Galman hired an 
attorney who requested similar information in writing. 
 Galman, who is African-American, learned that two white employees had received 
much larger lump-sum retirement payments than he did despite having held similar 
positions at Sysco for about the same number of years as Galman. He also alleges that 
white employees were honored in Sysco’s company newsletter when they retired, but he 
was not. Finally, Galman notes that Sysco’s “management team” was white. J.A. 51a. 
II. ERISA 
 ERISA gives courts discretion to impose a monetary penalty on retirement plan 
administrators who fail to provide plan beneficiaries with certain required information 
within 30 days of a request. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). Galman’s first count seeks to 
enforce § 1132(c)(1)’s penalty provision against the Sysco Defendants because they did 
not provide him with the information he requested about his retirement payment. The 
penalty only applies, however, if a plan administrator fails to provide information that it 
is required to provide by the provisions of Subchapter I of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1145. 
 Galman’s Complaint never identifies any provision of ERISA that requires the 
Sysco Defendants to provide him with the specific information he requested. Moreover, 
his request goes far beyond the ERISA disclosure requirements identified and examined 
by the District Court. See id. §§ 1025(a) (requiring disclosure of “total benefits accrued” 
and “the nonforfeitable pension benefits, if any, which have accrued, or the earliest date 
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on which benefits will become nonforfeitable”), 1024(b)(4) (requiring provision of “the 
latest updated summary plan description . . . or other instruments under which the plan is 
established or operated”). Accordingly, Galman’s first count fails to state a claim on 
which relief may be granted and was properly dismissed.1 
III. NJLAD 
 The Complaint’s second count alleges that the Sysco Defendants violated the 
NJLAD. Under it employers may not “discriminate against [an] individual in 
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” “because of [his] 
race[.]” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a). To state a discrimination claim, a plaintiff must 
plausibly allege, among other things, that “[he] suffered an adverse employment action; 
and [that] others not within the protected class did not suffer similar adverse employment 
actions.” El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's Univ. Hosp., 887 A.2d 1170, 1182 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2005). 
 Galman contends that the Sysco Defendants violated the NJLAD by paying him a 
smaller lump sum than two white employees who held similar jobs for the same number 
of years as he did. But the mere fact that Galman received a smaller retirement payment 
than other employees is not enough to infer that he suffered discrimination. The 
Complaint says nothing about the employees’ retirement contribution levels, annuity 
elections, or age at retirement—all of which could account for the alleged disparity. 
Moreover, the Complaint contains no evidence of ill will or discrimination, such as 
                                              
1 To the extent Galman raised a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim independent from his 
claim for statutory damages, that claim necessarily fails because the Sysco Defendants 
had no duty to provide him with the information he requested. 
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racially charged remarks. See Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 139 A.3d 1, 16 (N.J. 2016) 
(discriminatory remarks may serve as evidence of ill will under NJLAD). 
 As noted above, retiring white employees were honored in a company newsletter, 
while Galman was not. That is not enough to show discrimination either. “[A]n 
employer's adverse employment action must rise above something that makes an 
employee unhappy, resentful or otherwise cause an incidental workplace dissatisfaction.” 
Victor v. State, 952 A.2d 493, 505 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008), aff’d as modified, 
4 A.3d 126 (2010). Actions that “result in a bruised ego or injured pride” fall below this 
threshold. Id. 
 Finally, the Complaint repeats under count two that the Sysco Defendants failed to 
provide Galman with the information he requested about his retirement payment. Galman 
offers no facts suggesting that this failure was related to his race other than that he is 
African-American and Sysco’s management team is white. He also fails to allege that he 
was treated differently in this regard (that is, that other employees’ requests for 
information were answered).2 See El-Sioufi, 887 A.2d at 1182. Thus, the Complaint’s 
second count does not plausibly allege a claim of discrimination.3 
 
                                              
2 Galman also pursues an aiding and abetting claim against Sysco’s human resources 
manager. However, since no violation of the NJLAD occurred, this claim must fail 
because there is no one to aid or abet.  See Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 929 (N.J. 
2004) (holding that aiding and abetting liability requires that “the party whom the 
defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury”). 
 
3 The District Court held, in the alternative, that dismissal was warranted because 
Galman’s NJLAD claim was preempted by ERISA. Because we uphold dismissal of the 
Complaint’s second count for failure to state a claim, we do not reach that issue. 
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* * * * * 
 For these reasons we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Galman’s Complaint. 
   
 
 
  
 
